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Great subjects are illuminated best by small dramas. 
—V. S. Naipaul, The Enigma of Arrival
This is a story about the “greatest generation” that has not been told. It is not a story 
about homeowners in the suburbs but about renters in the city. It is not primarily about 
male veterans, although they are in here, as they should be. This story is about city dwell-
ers as they lived and worked in Chicago in the years following World War II. It is about 
ordinary people who faced big challenges in making a decent life for themselves—only 
one family per apartment now, maybe a television set—and their smaller but still serious 
trials, such as sharing dirty bathrooms off dark hallways. It is about too many people 
trying to live in spaces too few and too small. It is a war story, too, but not in the con-
ventional sense. Here, the city apartment building is the locus of struggle, cramped with 
working families and singles, old-timers and new wartime migrants, African Americans 
and white ethnics, all of them contenders for the long-heralded postwar “good life.” Ulti-
mately, this story is about their high expectations, hard choices, and reluctant trade-offs 
as they went from making war to making peace. 
These stories are less well known, partly because we historians have a bit of the journal-
ist in us; we can be more attracted to the epic battles, the grand personalities, and the cri-
ses of war than to its less epic aftermath. But war is also a process, a long and complicated 
course of agency building, economic planning, diplomacy, and morale management, ac-
tivities that both precede and follow the actual battle. Stories about that long ramp up to 
the fire fight, but even more so the often longer ramp down, can be overlooked by both 
popular and academic historians. War’s totality, however, deserves our careful scrutiny—
whatever our subfield—for war reaches deeply into civil society, scrambling some things 
and strengthening others, long after the fighting stops. Historical reflection on the years 
following a war can illuminate what people thought they were fighting for, what they 
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gained and lost, and what they expected in return for the sacrifice. For these and other 
reasons, we should dissect our postwar epochs as carefully as we have our wars.1
The demobilization (or reconversion) from World War II was a colossal national un-
dertaking of policy, politics, and people, and yet now, sixty years later, we know more of 
the contours than the finer details. Scholarly attention to demobilization has been fleet-
ing, in terms of both time and space. One historian says that we have divided the era awk-
wardly into categories of prewar and postwar and have thus “leap-frogged over this war-
to-peace transition.”2 Demobilization generally serves either as a postscript for a book on 
the war itself or as a hazy backdrop for subsequent Cold War dramas. The histories that 
actually linger in these years tend to locate the action in the suburbs. We have chased peo-
ple in their cars, driving from city street to suburban garage, rather than staying with the 
folks who remained in the city—by either choice or constraint. Newer studies that treat 
the postwar years “as more than a nondescript interlude of numbing inconsequence,” as 
Arnold Hirsch has wryly remarked, offer a smart urban corrective to this narrative. They 
remind us of “the way we never were,” but in these, too, the transition to peace is still the 
back story. Where we do find people wrestling with peacetime’s challenges, they tend to 
be policy makers, labor’s elite, or organized workers at the point of production. These ac-
counts have yielded important insights about liberal alliances and their push for progres-
sive policies in war’s aftermath, but they grow out of a somewhat sterile policy literature 
and are more attentive to economic planning, corporatism, and workers’ control.3
What we lack, then, is a narrative that captures demobilization’s colorful street-level 
history, where we can see people’s first encounters with reconversion and its more com-
plex political meanings, where we find citizens making bold political claims of their gov-
1 On war as a historical process, see John R. Gillis, ed., The Militarization of the Western World (New Bruns-
wick, 1989); and Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, 1995). 
On war as an urban process, see Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California, 1910–1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New 
York, 1992). 
2 Jack Stokes Ballard, The Shock of Peace: Military and Economic Demobilization after World War II (Washington, 
1983), vii. See also Mark D. Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again: America’s World War II Veterans Come Home 
(Lanham, 2001), vi. 
3 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960 (Chicago, 1998), viii; 
Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York, 1992). Newer stud-
ies on the postwar city include, for example, Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar 
Oakland (Princeton, 2003); and Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar 
Detroit (Princeton, 1996). On postwar Chicago, see Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; Wendy Plotkin, “‘Hemmed 
In’: The Struggle against Racial Restrictive Covenants and Deed Restrictions in Post–World War II Chicago,” Jour-
nal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 94 (Spring 2001), 39–69; and Amanda I. Seligman, Block by Block: Neigh-
borhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West Side (Chicago, 2005). 
On demobilization’s history, for economic and legislative issues, see Ballard, Shock of Peace; and for veteran is-
sues, see Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again. Lizabeth Cohen discusses reconversion’s policy and social history 
in Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York, 2003), 
100–165; Meg Jacobs, too, covers demobilization’s price control politics with some attention to consumers in Meg 
Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?’: The Office of Price Administration, Consumption Politics, and State Build-
ing from the Bottom Up, 1941–1946,” Journal of American History, 84 (Dec. 1997), 910–41; and Meg Jacobs, 
Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, 2005), 179–261. On Harry S. 
Truman’s reconversion fiscal policy, see Michael W. Flamm, “Price Controls, Politics, and the Perils of Policy by 
Analogy: Economic Demobilization after World War II,” Journal of Policy History, 8 (1996), 335–55. For treatment 
of reconversion’s economic policy history, see Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” in The Rise 
and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton, 1989), 100–112; on 
reconversion’s labor politics, see Nelson Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized La-
bor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era,” ibid., 122–52. George Lipsitz is the exception here, 
offering a social, cultural, and labor history of war’s aftermath, but his is not a history of demobilization per se; see 
George Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s (Urbana, 1994). 
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ernment but outside of the traditional pressure points that shape state policies. Unfortu-
nately, into this narrative breach has flowed a string of sentimental mainstream histories 
about the World War II cohort that have gripped the popular imagination. The best 
known among these, of course, is Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation, which tells the 
stories of both veterans and home front warriors as they tried to rebuild their lives. Bro-
kaw’s genial appellation has stuck, and now the “greatest generation” has become a cottage 
industry, a shorthand for World War II–era America, like Studs Terkel’s “the good war.” 
While Terkel used his term introspectively and ironically, Brokaw wields his phrase auda-
ciously, confident of its historical accuracy. Defending his contention that the 1930s and 
1940s spawned “the greatest generation any society has ever produced,” he writes: “While 
I am periodically challenged on this premise, I believe I have the facts on my side.”4
But the facts might not even be necessary—at least as far as the public is concerned. 
Any observer of popular culture knows that the “greatest generation” currently holds a 
sort of mythic power, even beyond Brokaw’s project. It is not my intention to deny this 
generation its genuine heroics or storytelling. Nor do I want simply to debunk a popular 
genre—although, as David Kennedy has remarked, professional historians have “got to 
be ready to commit blasphemy” when it comes to shaping American memory about “the 
good war.”5 Rather, this article seeks to historicize the peace, to examine what happened 
after guns and machines fell silent in August 1945. My aim is to freeze the action in the 
postwar city and examine demobilization as its own historical process, fraught with its 
own set of conflicts and negotiations over what “postwar” really meant for ordinary citi-
zens.
As an urban social history, this essay uncovers peacetime’s harsh trade-offs and taxing 
adaptations for city dwellers. War-weary and eager for victory, they certainly welcomed 
the truce, but it would be a mistake to assume that peace did not introduce its own set of 
wrenching changes. As the war wound down, soldiers eagerly left the European and Asian 
theaters, and crowded cities from east to west became a different kind of theater in which 
veterans and civilians alike sparred over the meanings and spoils of war. As George Lipsitz 
has written, the grand transition from war to peace “turned common and ordinary places 
like city buses, municipal parks, and housing projects into contested spaces where com-
peting individuals and groups hammered out new ways of living.”6
Apartment buildings were among the most important of these contested spaces in 
which people tried to find “normalcy.” Here, economics and physical proximity were 
intertwined and in play at all hours, unlike at the workplace, where class and closeness 
could be decoupled at the end of the shift. In apartment housing, tenants lived among 
their “bosses,” building managers for the most part but sometimes owners. And they lived 
even closer to fellow tenants, dependent on one another to share tight quarters, as they 
had during depression and war. We get a rare peek into these flats through the records 
4 Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (New York, 1998), xxx. Studs Terkel, “The Good War”: An Oral History of 
World War II (New York, 1984). Works that challenge nostalgic histories of World War II include Michael C. C. Ad-
ams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II (Baltimore, 1994); Lewis A. Erenberg and Susan E. Hirsch, eds., 
The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness during World War II (Chicago, 1996); Roger W. Lotchin, 
ed., The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War (Urbana, 2000); and Richard Polenberg, “The 
Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society,” Virginia Magazine of History and Bi-
ography, 100 (July 1992), 295–322. 
5 Chicago Tribune, Feb. 11, 2001, sec. 14, p. 3.
6 Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight, 20.
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of the Office of Price Administration and the Office of the Housing Expediter, two gov-
ernment agencies set up to oversee the wartime and postwar housing supply. Most of the 
city’s rental housing was under federal rent control, administered by these agencies from 
1942 through 1953, so, when landlords or tenants had either inquiry or complaint, they 
pleaded their case through one of these offices. In the dizzying array of landlord petitions, 
tenant letters, affidavits, and investigative reports, we meet familiar characters in the post-
war city, but this time in the intimacy of their homes, not at the factory or office. Mar-
riage and babies, aging parents, illness, poverty, vulnerability, and indignation are all in 
here, offering vivid snapshots of the daily grind of demobilization.
The stories from Elm Street feature some of what popular audiences have found so in-
spiring about Brokaw’s tales: individual resolve, teamwork, hope, and enterprise—all for a 
better life after the war. And yet these accounts also show what people did for themselves 
and to one another as they tried to achieve that good life. Some citizens felt they had sac-
rificed more than others, and still all felt entitled to prosper. As a result, their pursuit of 
postwar affluence could get contentious. In fact, as the following cases will show, property 
owners, building managers, and tenants were class rivals in the quest for postwar abun-
dance. Their battles with each other were often fierce, and they used whatever economic 
strategies they had—some legal, some not—to capitalize on potential peacetime rewards. 
To varying degrees and with different leverage, they all called on their better and baser 
instincts to grab a share of the long-promised postwar peace dividend.
In the end, these gritty conflicts from inside Chicago’s apartments offer more than an 
urban chronicle of peacetime’s discordant history. In effect, they challenge an aging but 
durable conventional wisdom in political history about the reach and scope of the post-
war state. It seems scholars have announced prematurely the death of popular expecta-
tions for postwar governmental activism. The generation that had survived a protracted 
depression and war anticipated a substantial consolation prize for their suffering. I argue 
that these citizen-soldiers were now citizen-survivors who came to define reconversion 
not just as the ebb of their sacrifice but as a nascent political culture of reciprocity and 
expectation between state and citizen. In fact, the case of rent control demonstrates that 
the answer to the oft-cited 1946 Republican campaign taunt, “Had enough?,” was actu-
ally “not quite,” despite the Republicans’ antistatist political triumph that year and some 
genuine fatigue with government intervention. Weary of wartime regulations, citizens 
were also wary of none. Federal rent control was the most invasive of all price controls, 
and yet it alone endured the political assaults on the welfare-warfare state of the 1940s. 
Its survival nationwide, even into the early fifties, reveals that working people expected 
their government to cushion the blows of reconversion with some of the same muscular 
regulatory power it had deployed in wartime.7
7 This argument challenges an interpretation that can be found in many general histories of the postwar period, 
but its most recent iteration is in Jacobs, who claims that the postwar failures of the Office of Price Administration 
(OPA) represented a “transformation of political consciousness,” resulting in “diminished public support for an activ-
ist state” after the 1946 elections: Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 229–31. Similarly, Alan Brinkley discusses “a fear of the 
state” in the postwar years: Alan Brinkley, “World War II and American Liberalism,” in War in American Culture, ed. 
Erenberg and Hirsch, 320–21; see also James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (New 
York, 1996), 59–60. Cohen finds eroding popular support for price controls, but her analysis offers nuances not 
found in others; see Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 100–109, 129–32, esp. 105n124. Brinkley also traces liberal pol-
icy makers’ disillusionment with regulatory practices in Brinkley, “New Deal and the Idea of the State,” 100–112. 
See also Flamm, “Price Controls, Politics, and the Perils of Policy by Analogy,” 350–51. 
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Which brings us to Elm Street, circa 1945. Here, apartments swelled with transient 
workers, the unemployed, families, and young singles, and they all experienced demobili-
zation most immediately as a housing crisis. Those lucky enough to find housing on Elm 
lived on a street of extremes. Elm ran east to west, from Chicago’s luxurious lakefront to 
its northern riverbank and railroad corridor, a tangle of train track and smokestack since 
the late nineteenth century. Elm sat within the city’s Near North Side, a neighborhood 
of two and a half square miles north of Chicago’s downtown. Concentrated in this area 
were elements of any large U.S. city: light and heavy industry, high- and low-end retail, 
well-appointed apartment residences and ramshackle rooming houses. Walking west on 
Elm from Lake Michigan, one could go from Chicago’s “gold coast,” an area of three-
story mansions and high-rise “apartment homes” that housed the city’s elite, to rooming-
house districts and withering apartment housing peopled with the European immigrant 
working class and its descendants, along with new war migrants such as southern blacks 
and even Japanese Americans newly freed from internment camps. At the southern tip of 
the neighborhood flowed the Chicago River, light industry hugging the shore, and at the 
northern border lay North Avenue, a street that traced its origins to the city’s earliest land 
surveying in the 1830s. Harvey Warren Zorbaugh, one of the first sociologists to chroni-
cle the Near North Side, described it as a neighborhood of “vivid contrasts . . . between 
the old and the new, between the native and the foreign . . . between wealth and poverty, 
vice and respectability . . . luxury and toil.”8
On the 400 block of West Elm Street, there was mostly toil. Peter and Mary La Dolce 
were the husband-and-wife managers of a building that stretched over several addresses in 
the industrial quadrant of the Near North Side.9 Tenants lived in about twenty-two flats, 
many of which had five rooms—certainly big for the time, considering how many prop-
erty owners had carved up large apartments into smaller ones during the war. The build-
ing itself, 400–410 West Elm, was an older structure that resembled others in the area. 
The Chicago Plan Commission surveyed the vicinity in 1948 and found apartments and 
single-family homes of brick or frame construction, usually three stories tall; more than 
half were over fifty years old, built around the turn of the century. Scattered throughout 
were factories and warehouses just as old as the housing stock: Montgomery Ward’s mail-
order operation, a Dr. Scholl’s plant, and an Oscar Mayer meat-packing house anchored 
the industrial southwestern part of the neighborhood. Large tracts of vacant land, too, lay 
adjacent to some of these factories and apartments, reminders that financial ruin could 
move in right next door and stay a while. The area’s two parks were each something of an 
oasis, visual counterpoints to the brick and smoke, but even the plan commission noted 
that, on this end of the neighborhood, “Very little foliage can be observed.” For residents, 
this left a rather schizophrenic landscape of industrial busy and blighted idle—with little 
green.10
8 Information on neighborhood geography can be found in Chicago Plan Commission, Chicago Land Use Sur-
vey, vol. 2: Land Use in Chicago (Chicago, 1942). Harvey Warren Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum: A Socio-
logical Study of Chicago’s Near North Side (Chicago, 1929), 4.
9 I will refer to those who owned an apartment building as “owner” or “landlord.” The term “building manager” 
refers to those who operated but did not own a building. Rent control documents reveal careless usage of the two 
terms, as officials often called a building manager a landlord when, in fact, he or she did not own. 
10 Chicago Plan Commission, “Ten Square Miles of Chicago: A Report to the Land Clearance Commission,” 
June 1948, pp. 3–6, Municipal Reference Collection (Harold Washington Library Center, Chicago, Ill.).
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Residents living at 400–410 Elm ranged from solidly working class to poor, and their 
building managers were apparently not much better off. Peter and Mary La Dolce did not 
own the property; a Mr. Louis Brugger did. But, like many other owners in the neighbor-
hood, he did not make a home there; he made money there. The La Dolces did not live 
in the building either. They lived only a few blocks away—a short walk, fortunately, be-
cause it was their job to deal with the almost daily needs of people living in close quarters. 
The La Dolces occupied a curious class position: as Brugger’s building managers or hired 
landlords, you might say, they had considerable power over tenants through rent collec-
tion and the prerogative to either fix a broken window or let a tenant live interminably 
with a cold draft. On the other hand, they were also Brugger’s employees, a relationship 
that began in August 1944 when they signed a lease to manage his property. They paid 
Brugger a flat sum per month, and in return they were to run the building as a business, 
profiting from collecting rents that exceeded their own monthly payment to Brugger and 
the maintenance costs. Although this arrangement put the La Dolces barely a rung above 
their tenants on the socioeconomic ladder, as we will see, they clashed mightily over the 
particulars of daily life in the building.11
11 Case Records, folders: La Dolce, Peter and Mary, box 42, entry 110, Sample Rent Enforcement Case Records, 
Region VI, 1942–1953, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter, RG 252 (National Archives and Records 
Administration—Great Lakes Region, Chicago, Ill.). 
This photograph of 400 West Elm Street, taken in 1966, captures the kind of three-story, multi-
family housing typical on the west end of Elm Street at the end of World War II. In this area, poor 
and working-class renters occupied crowded, older units built around the turn of the century. 
Few of these units were owner-occupied, and many were in need of major repair. The Brugger/La 
Dolce building, located across the street, had one more floor than this and two storefronts. Benny 
MacAbee lived in a two-story building a few blocks away, on the first floor. Courtesy Chicago His-
torical Society, ICHi-39051.
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The local story of how Brugger, the La Dolces, and their disgruntled Elm Street ten-
ants locked horns over the bread-and-butter issues of demobilization starts in the Office 
of Price Administration (OPA). The paper trail begins here, because World War II put the 
federal government in the business of apartment management. The need to forge what 
Roger Lotchin calls a “connection between the city and the sword” brought the federal 
government deeply into urban affairs. Well before U.S. forces fired a shot, defense plan-
ners pondered how to harness the resources and capacities of American cities for military 
production. They understood that housing had to be part of their careful calibration of 
wartime production and consumption. Apartment housing was of particular concern 
given the potential for rent inflation, a destabilizing factor in any wartime economy. To 
counter this, in the last half of 1941, the OPA experimented with voluntary “fair rent com-
mittees,” but these failed to cajole, harass, or shame owners into voluntary compliance.12
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, however, what was voluntary became regulatory. 
“War, that prolific parent of legislation,” as one legal scholar put it, spurred Congress to 
pass the Emergency Price Control Act in January 1942, giving the OPA authority to sta-
bilize and then regulate prices, including rent.13 In March 1942, the OPA’s Rent Division 
created 20 “defense rental areas” in thirteen states. By the next month, they had added 
302 areas to the list, and by 1947 this number had mushroomed to over 600. These “ar-
eas” were actually the cities and towns with war-related industry or military bases—the 
certain destinations of thousands of wartime migrants. Planners hoped that rent con-
trol would hold down the cost of housing, thereby enabling workers to go where the 
work was and stay a while. Price stability in the housing market meant defense contracts 
fulfilled, owners compensated, workers appeased, and loaded bombers flying east and 
west.14
With rent control firmly in place by mid-1942, the OPA had to set up shop in every 
defense rental area to fulfill its mandate. Chicago proved to be one of the agency’s most 
important outposts in the fight against inflationary rents. The city’s location and its di-
verse manufacturing base attracted defense contracts and job seekers, making it one of 
the urban-industrial hubs of the war. According to Perry Duis, 1,400 Chicago industries 
had produced $24 billion worth of war-related equipment by the end of World War II, 
a total bested only by Detroit.15 Although Chicago did not have the sizable ports of East 
or West Coast cities, it was still the “crossroads city,” a national and international inter-
change where people and products moved in and out at all hours of the day by water, 
truck, and rail. It was the nation’s central railroad depot, “the place where Americans 
changed trains,” whether civilian or soldier. Chicago’s Travelers Aid Society estimated 
that between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the end of 1945, almost nine million mi-
12 Lotchin, Fortress California, 1–2. On rent control’s history, see Neil H. Lebowitz, “‘Above Party, Class, or 
Creed’: Rent Control in the United States, 1940–1947,” Journal of Urban History, 7 (Aug. 1981), 439–70; and 
Monica Lett, Rent Control: Concepts, Realities, and Mechanisms (New Brunswick, 1976). On Chicago specifically, 
see Wendy Plotkin, “Rent Control in Chicago after World War II: Politics, People, and Controversy,” Prologue, 
30 (Summer 1998), 111–23. For a legal history of rent control (national and international), see John W. Willis, 
“A Short History of Rent Control Laws,” Cornell Law Quarterly, 36 (1950), 54–94. On wartime urban planning 
and housing, see Philip J. Funigiello, The Challenge to Urban Liberalism: Federal-City Relations during World War II 
(Knoxville, 1978), 80–119. 
13 Willis, “Short History of Rent Control Laws,” 54–55.
14 Lett, Rent Control, 2–5; Lebowitz, “‘Above Party, Class, or Creed,’” 442–53. 
15 Perry R. Duis, “Symbolic Unity and the Neighborhood: Chicago during World War II,” Journal of Urban 
History, 21 (Jan. 1995), 201. 
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grating workers, military recruits, and members of their families passed through the city’s 
six train terminals. The soldiers’ presence in the city was noticeable, not only because so 
many came through by train but also because two of the military’s largest service centers 
were located just outside of it. In addition, Chicago became a branch office for many of 
the civilian managers of the war. Dubbed “Little Washington” by a Chicago newspaper, 
the city became home for over a dozen nonmilitary wartime agencies.16
Back on Elm Street, we can see something of how these wartime transformations be-
gan to manifest themselves. In the war’s early years, Louis Brugger rented his flats mostly 
to Italians, probably among the last of the Italian American community that had settled 
on the Near North Side in the late nineteenth century. Brugger did not endear himself 
to these Elm Street paesani. Like many owners, he found himself in an enviable position 
early in the war, and he tried to profit from it. There had been little new construction in 
Chicago (or nationwide) during the Great Depression. On the Near North Side, almost 
all of the new housing since 1930 had been built on the more upscale east end. Now 
the war’s insatiable appetite for materials and labor ensured that the city’s housing stock 
would remain low for the foreseeable future, enabling Brugger to nudge rents upward.
Compounding the shortage was what Philip Funigiello has called the “great defense 
migration.” This massive population shift was a national phenomenon, of course, as mi-
grants moved from economically decaying cities and adjacent towns to urban cores where 
they could find steady, better-paying jobs. Chicago was but one of many older industrial 
cities nationwide rewarded with lucrative government contracts, which, in turn, lured 
newcomers to the city. From 1940 to 1942 alone, about 150,000 people came to Chi-
cago’s Cook County.17 On the Near North Side, many of these were African Americans, 
part of the second great black migration. Wartime wages and “the talk”—tales of sweeter 
rewards up north—drew them to Chicago, and many settled on the Near North Side, be-
coming one-fifth of the whole neighborhood by 1950. Here, they clustered in rooming-
house areas, alongside older European immigrants, where owners such as Brugger chose 
opportunism over patriotism, charging his mostly Italian but increasingly African Ameri-
can renters above his building’s OPA price ceiling.18
By V-J Day, owners such as Brugger were hoping that wartime migrants would stay 
and rent control would go, for a sustained housing shortage would allow them to hike 
rents without pesky OPA watchdogs. But consumer groups wanted federal regulators to 
stay on the job because price controls had worked. In December 1945, OPA chief Chester 
Bowles reported to Congress that wartime rent increases in defense areas had not risen 
above 4 percent. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, from 1945 to 1947 the cost 
of rent for an average moderate-income family rose just over 5 percent, while clothing, 
16 Information on wartime Chicago taken from Perry R. Duis and Scott LaFrance, We’ve Got a Job to Do: Chi-
cagoans and World War II (Chicago, 1992), 3, 97, 103. On train station traffic, see Mrs. A. L. Tidball to Statistical 
Department, April 12, 1946, folder 15, Travelers Aid Society of Chicago Papers (Department of Special Collections, 
Richard J. Daley Library, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Ill.). 
17 Funigiello, Challenge to Urban Liberalism, 3–38, esp. 3. See also Plotkin, “Rent Control in Chicago after 
World War II,” 112. 
18 Population figures on Chicago’s African Americans are in Philip M. Hauser and Evelyn M. Kitagawa, eds., 
Local Community Fact Book for Chicago, 1950 (Chicago, 1953), 6, 39; and Evelyn M. Kitagawa and Karl E. Taeu-
ber, eds., Local Community Fact Book, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1960 (Chicago, 1963), 31. See also Otis Dudley 
Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession (Chicago, 1957). 
On black migration to Chicago, see Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It 
Changed America (New York, 1992). 
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which had been decontrolled after the war, rose a whopping 42 percent.19 These statistics 
were not an abstraction for consumers. People experienced prices—outrage at an expensive 
but needed winter coat, frustration with a diet lean on costly dairy products, fear about 
rent hikes, and relief when good economizing met family needs for the month. It is no 
wonder, then, that consumers saw in controls a leveling effect—on both prices and pas-
sions. Meg Jacobs’s study of meat prices found that 75 percent of Americans looked to 
controls to secure the much-hoped-for “affordable abundance” of war’s aftermath. And, 
according to Lizabeth Cohen, in the months following the war, “the vast majority of the 
public continued to register support for price controls on every opinion poll taken.”20
In Washington and in cities across the country, liberal and conservative factions de-
bated the fate of price controls with equal passion and partisanship. In the midst of the 
war, OPA researcher Nathan Katz warned that demobilization would “tax the nation’s abil-
ity to the utmost as surely as has the war. We must be ready for it.” At the end of the war, 
the OPA sounded a full alarm: “There’s danger ahead. . . . Housing shortages, increasingly 
severe since the war began, now total 10 million dwelling units. . . . It will take years for 
deficiencies to be wiped out.” The OPA’s repeated emphasis on reconversion as largely a 
housing crisis that would lead to family evictions and homelessness evoked painfully fresh 
memories for a nation of Great Depression survivors. For President Harry S. Truman 
and his advisers, though, the more salient memories came not from the depression, but 
from World War I, when “the demobilization debacle of 1919” led to massive inflation 
and labor unrest, an economic calamity postwar planners were hoping to avoid. Within 
Truman’s staff, however, there was heated disagreement about how to head that off. The 
dispute hinged on whether to stimulate consumption or production to insure a healthy 
reconversion economy. The OPA’s Bowles argued that only price controls could contain 
inflation and sustain consumer confidence, while Office of War Mobilization and Recon-
version chief John Snyder claimed that lifting controls would unleash production, gener-
ating jobs and restoring business confidence.21
After months of fierce debate, Snyder and his allies in the business community ulti-
mately prevailed, and almost all controls began to disappear following the 1946 election. 
And yet, as such items as meat, gasoline, clothing, and furniture became decontrolled, 
rent control remained. Property owners such as Brugger, then, got only half their wish; 
migrants stayed in the city, but regulation did too. Rent control survived partly because 
everyone across the political spectrum recognized that the housing crisis had outlived the 
war, just as the OPA had warned, and that the situation was not likely to improve anytime 
soon. Rent control remained, too, because of a desire among all constituencies—what-
ever their price control politics—to cushion the veterans’ reintegration. In fact, it was 
this concern for veterans’ needs that spawned a new agency that would eventually absorb 
some of the OPA’s rent control functions. In May 1946, Congress charged the Office of 
19 Chester Bowles’s testimony reprinted in OPA, A Home You Can Afford (Washington, 1946), 27. U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, “Current Labor Statistics,” Monthly Labor Review, 65 (Dec. 1947), 730. 
20 Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?,’” 933; Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 102.
21 Nathan Katz, “When the Last Boys Came Back: How the U.S. and Britain Handled Demobilization after the 
Last War,” Survey Graphic, 32 (Dec. 1943), 516; OPA, Rent Control Protects You (Washington, 1945), n.p. On Tru-
man, see Flamm, “Price Controls, Politics, and the Perils of Policy by Analogy,” 337–42, esp. 337; Ballard, Shock of 
Peace, 155–74; and Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 221–45. On the politics of controls in relation to housing, see Bar-
ton Bernstein, “Reluctance and Resistance: Wilson Wyatt and Veterans’ Housing in the Truman Administration,” 
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 65 (1967), 47–66; Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform during the Truman 
Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), 40–58; and Lebowitz, “‘Above Party, Class, or Creed,’” 459–61.
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the Housing Expediter (OHE) with coordinating reconversion housing programs, espe-
cially mortgage assistance for returning G.I.’s. As the OPA gradually dissolved in 1946, the 
OHE picked up its busy rent-control business, effectively transferring the OPA’s responsi-
bility for wartime rent control to a veteran-focused postwar housing agency. This transfer 
of functions put rent control back on life support, now under the auspices of the Hous-
ing Expediter. The Housing and Rent Act of 1947 (and its yearly renewal) acknowledged 
that, although the war was over, there was still “a housing emergency” that required “cer-
tain restrictions on rents” to continue. Thus, the OPA, and then the OHE, stayed on the 
job from August 1945 to as late as the spring of 1953, charged with determining a “fair 
price” for those returning G.I.’s and civilians who lived in the defense rental areas estab-
lished in wartime.22
Postwar Americans followed this flurry of agency dismantling and rebuilding, even if 
they did not understand every detail. After food, rent was the second most costly item in 
22 On rent control’s transformation and ultimate weakening, see Lett, Rent Control, 2–5; Lebowitz, “‘Above Par-
ty, Class, or Creed,’” 457–63; and Plotkin, “Rent Control in Chicago after World War II.” Housing and Rent Act 
quoted in U.S. Department of Labor, Bruno Schiro, “Residential Rents under the 1947 Housing and Rent Act,” 
Monthly Labor Review, 66 (Jan. 1948), 14. Because the OPA administered rent control until early 1947, well after 
the war ended, and the Office of the Housing Expediter (OHE) gradually absorbed its rent control activities from 
late 1946 through early 1947, I will use the acronym OPA/OHE, except when the specific case being discussed was 
adjudicated specifically by one agency or the other. 
This 1945 Office of Price Administration (OPA) poster alerted tenants that their 
flats were protected by federal rent control. Tenants might see these posted in any 
number of neighborhood places, including their local public library, union hall, 
area park district building, or settlement house. The final sentence shows OPA’s self-
promotion in holding the line on prices throughout the war. Courtesy National 
Archives and Records Administration, Great Lakes Region, Chicago (RG 252, Entry 
174, Box 1, Folder: Executive Memos, 186–284 [2]).
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an average working-class family budget, so the politics surrounding its price were worth 
tracking.23 Chicagoans and city dwellers nationwide could learn about policy changes 
without too much effort, for the OPA and OHE had impressive national and regional public 
relations operations around the country, and prepackaged “rent stories” made their way 
into local newspapers, radio shows, and neighborhood information campaigns. In large 
cities from Los Angeles to New York and in smaller outposts such as Fargo, North Dako-
ta, or Peoria, Illinois, the area OPA/OHE office served as the contact point between federal 
law and local experience, and owners, building managers, and tenants knew that they had 
to negotiate their peacetime squabbles at these branch offices.
In Chicago, on Elm Street and elsewhere, these negotiations grew out of the forced 
intimacy of the crowded postwar apartment building, where disparate groups had to oc-
cupy the same real estate: federal policy makers, local rent administrators, owners, man-
agers, and tenants. Sometimes there was a convergence of interests, but more often there 
was conflict. We know more about the conflict than the harmony, because harmony 
leaves a smaller paper trail. Skirmishes, on the other hand, made their way to the OPA/
OHE rent offices, leaving richly detailed case records. What we find in these documents is 
a three-way competition among owners, building managers, and tenants for the much-
touted postwar abundance. These factions battled one another ostensibly about the price 
of rent, but these quarrels were also about their grander hopes that the transition to peace 
would bring freedom from want, as their wartime president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had 
promised. Each group eyed the others as contenders for that postwar wealth, and so they 
viewed demobilization as a first chance to press their government to deliver on its prom-
ises.24
To understand this triangular economic competition, we have to move into an apart-
ment building, circa 1946. Only from the inside can we grasp the perspectives of everyone 
in the rivalry. Starting with property owners, then, large and small, they felt the calami-
ties of the last ten years had crippled them. The depression had broken one leg, wartime 
regulation broke the other, and now, already on their knees, they could be knocked over 
completely by postwar controls. Just to stand up again, they felt they had to raise rents 
to recover long-lost revenues. And to profit, to thrive in the way they felt they really de-
served, many felt justified in cutting corners and outsmarting rent control laws.
The most common landlord strategy to recoup earnings was simple: overcharge with-
out getting caught. On Elm Street, Brugger had already been nabbed in 1943 for trying 
to do just that—charging rents high above OPA ceilings while flying just under its radar. 
He got caught again just a few weeks after victory in Japan—as he, no doubt, awaited rent 
control’s demise. A tenant complaint summoned an OPA investigator to the premises on 
August 30, 1945, but he could not verify if anyone was being overcharged because Brug-
ger and the La Dolces had failed to do their paperwork. Federal legislation required own-
23 U.S. Department of Labor, Lester S. Kellogg and Dorothy S. Brady, “The City Worker’s Family Budget,” 
Monthly Labor Review, 66 (Feb. 1948), 133–70.
24 Cases are drawn from the OPA and OHE’s rent control records, located in the National Archives, Great Lakes 
Region, Chicago. I examined disputes in three neighborhoods: the Near North Side, Lincoln Park, and Lakeview. 
I reviewed 51 cases, 11 of which were just outside of my three areas, leaving me with 40 cases in the three neigh-
borhoods. Each case file contained some combination of the agency complaint and response forms, investigators’ 
notes and official reports, affidavits, correspondence, and, sometimes, court documents. These rent disputes were 
neither unusual nor exceptional, for OHE officials selected these cases for the archives as representative of the tens of 
thousands that came before them—in Chicago and throughout the rest of the midwestern region. The rest of the 
case files were destroyed. 
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ers (or managers) to register each dwelling unit, assigning a rent and a set of services that 
an occupant could expect throughout their tenancy. Rents could be set no higher than 
what they were on a “maximum rent date,” that is, before the war sent prices soaring.25
But thousands of owners did not register their flats, because their idea of a fair rent 
was higher than their government’s. The frequency with which tenants complained about 
overcharges on the Near North Side and throughout the city suggests that it was the fa-
vorite among owners’ and managers’ myriad tactics. The records are rife with stories of 
tenants who asked their landlord to see the registration form and were denied the right—
either because it did not exist or because the landlord wanted to hide the government’s 
price. At 400 West Elm, as Brugger’s proxies, the La Dolces intermittently charged tenants 
$10 above the registered rent from August 1944 through August 1947. They told tenants 
that the extra money was necessary for structural improvements and maintenance, but 
they craftily hid their price hike by providing receipts with only the legal rent recorded. If 
a tenant complained, the La Dolces could open their books and claim innocence.
Eventually, tenants became wise to the La Dolces’ scam, probably because after a year 
of paying extra, they noticed that the promised building improvements were about as real 
as an imaginary friend. It is not clear who was brave enough to file the initial complaint 
or how that turned into a group grievance, but it escalated that far, not once, but twice: 
first as the war came to a close in the summer of 1945, and again exactly two years later. 
In the first round, it appears that Mrs. Isabelle Lewis finally refused in July 1945 to con-
tinue paying $10 above ceiling, a rate she had paid for a year. But before Lewis and her 
husband moved away (the next record finds them in a different building but still in the 
neighborhood), they must have managed to compare notes with nine others, who joined 
them in filing affidavits with the OPA in August 1945. In crowded buildings, it would have 
been hard not to run into a neighbor in the hallways. In good weather, before television 
and air conditioning, it would have been easy to encounter neighbors on the sidewalk, 
hanging out of open windows, or sitting on a front stoop. Year round, too, these tenants 
likely leaned on one another in various ways, borrowing and sharing household items that 
they could not afford on their own. And in this swapping of stuff they could also swap 
stories about needed repairs and when it was exactly they had last seen Mr. La Dolce fix 
anything.26
Two months after Lewis complained, the OPA took the La Dolces to court to stop the 
overcharging, and this fairly quick action—and the hallway buzz likely generated by it—
emboldened tenants to push through a second collective complaint in August 1947. In 
this round, tenants recounted again how they would hand either Mr. or Mrs. La Dolce 
the inflated rent, only to receive a receipt with the lesser amount listed. James Green, a 
veteran and now a U.S. Army employee, lived on the third floor at 406 West Elm with 
his wife, her sister, a friend, and the friend’s wife—a crowded arrangement like so many 
others in the building. He testified, “we were to give him an extra $10 each month so he 
could keep the building.” Green had a stack of receipts for $15, even though he had been 
paying $25 per month since he moved there in July 1944. Frank Welch, a laundry worker 
25 Elmer Hedin to R. R. Anderson, memo, Aug. 30, 1945, folder: La Dolce, Peter and Mary (2), box 42, entry 
110, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
26 Affidavit, Jennie Turnage, ibid.; affidavit, Odessa Wallington, ibid.; affidavit, Otis Jackson, ibid.; affidavit, 
Katie Booker, ibid.; affidavit, Essie Smith, ibid.; affidavit, Bessie Welch, ibid.; affidavit, Josephine Battles, ibid.; af-
fidavit, Ruth Donaldson, ibid.; affidavit, Felix Henley, ibid.; affidavit, Isabelle Lewis, ibid.
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on the city’s west side, told investigators that since 1944 he and his wife, too, had been 
paying that amount. Mr. La Dolce reduced the rent only when the OPA “got after him,” 
said Welch, and now he hoped his testimony could help the new OHE to do the same..27
In both brushes with the OPA/OHE, even with their ruse fully exposed, the La Dol-
ces were not repentant, but defiant, echoing the responses of owners and hired land-
lords all over the city when confronted with their overcharging. Asked in 1947 to ex-
plain why there were no leases, Peter La Dolce claimed dismissively, “the tenants did not 
want them.” Faced with affidavits that detailed their inventive accounting, the La Dolces 
pressed their side of the story in both 1945 and 1947 through court documents, their 
vitriol for controls fully unleashed. In the 1945 case, they defended themselves with a 
counter accusation: “all of the tenants . . . have illegally conspired together to bring what-
ever harm and trouble they can,” they claimed. They then challenged rent control itself, 
arguing it was patently “illegal, invalid and unconstitutional.” The “wartime emergencies” 
were over, they said, and “all the people of the United States should not be bound” by re-
strictive controls any longer.28
In making these claims, the La Dolces drew on several years of both organized and 
informal resistance to rent control from coalitions of landlords, real estate agents, and 
builders. At the start of the war, Chicago Real Estate Board members and city landlords 
told OPA officials that controls were “unwarranted and will be resisted.” Rents were al-
ready “at an unreasonably low level” during the depression, they griped, and wartime 
controls would introduce yet another disincentive to build new properties. At the end 
of the war, the powerful National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) spread this 
message nationwide, dispatching speakers to decry rent control’s continuation. This or-
ganizing effort increased NAREB’s membership, as landlords and real estate agents around 
the country formed local NAREB affiliates to strengthen the organization’s lobbying mus-
cle. In 1949, the Chicago-based National Home and Property Owners Foundation, for 
example, published an open letter to Congress, calling the OHE director a “Housing Dic-
tator” whose agency “creates and continues shortages, instead of promoting more hous-
ing.”29
Such charges were inflammatory but not baseless. In fact, rent control (along with 
unfavorable financing terms) did have a dampening effect on the construction of multi-
family dwellings in postwar cities. It encouraged developers to look outside city limits for 
more favorable investment opportunities. But even before the suburban building trend 
27 Chief to Information Officer, memo, Oct. 17, 1945, ibid.; affidavit, James F. Green, Aug. 21, 1947, Tighe 
Woods, Acting Housing Expediter, OHE, v. Peter La Dolce and Mary La Dolce, 45C 8347, Circuit Court of Cook Coun-
ty, Ill. (Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County Archives, Chicago, Ill.); affidavit, Frank Welch, Aug. 19, 1947, 
folder: LaDolce, Peter and Mary (2), box 42, entry 110, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
28 Handwritten notes, Aug. 28, 1947, folder: La Dolce, Peter and Mary (2), box 42, entry 110, Records of the 
Office of the Housing Expediter; La Dolce, Answer, Nov. 17, 1945, Woods v. La Dolce and La Dolce.
29 Report of the Legal Staff of the Chicago Rent Section on Rents, Vacancies, Etc., in Chicago, March 28, 1942, 
folder: Report of Legal Staff of Chicago, box 1, entry 175, Reports of Field Inspectors Concerning Local Office 
Operations, 1942–1947, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. On the opposition of the National As-
sociation of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), see John Joseph Ryan to Tom Tippett et al., memo, July 5, 1945, folder: 
Narrative Reports, 1945 (2), box 6, entry 107, Narrative Reports of Area Rent Offices, 1942–1951, ibid. See also 
Lebowitz, “‘Above Party, Class, or Creed,’” 449–54. Landlords’ organized opposition to rent control can be found 
throughout the OPA/OHE records, as both federal and local officials kept track of such activities. “An Open Letter 
to Congress,” Quincy Herald-Whig, March 1, 1949, clipping, in folder: 1948, box 4, Administrative Files, Chicago 
Regional Office, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter; see also Property Owners News, April 19, 1948, 
ibid.
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crested, rent control led urban owners during and immediately after the war to sell their 
properties in the superheated, nonregulated market for owner-occupied housing. The 
steady rise in home ownership in the 1940s, then, was not the result of new construction, 
but the result of what the Department of Labor identified as a “drastic shift” of properties 
“from the rental to the sales market.” Home builders, too, thus joined real estate officials 
and landlords zealously to condemn rent control. Chicago’s OPA rent director, John Joseph 
Ryan, encountered this hostility as early as the spring of 1945 when he attended a meet-
ing with the Chicago Metropolitan Home Builders Association. He appeared with a host 
of other federal officials, but he alone was “roundly ‘booed’” by the builders.30
As much as owners liked to complain about rent control’s “big government” restric-
tions, they knew there were perfectly legal ways to collect more money from tenants. Af-
ter all, the OPA/OHE was pro-consumer, not anticapitalist, and Congress’s rent laws repre-
sented limits on, not eviscerations of, the sanctity of property ownership. A few examples 
from the law make the point. If there was a spike in property taxes or operating costs, or 
if owners made structural improvements or increased services (such as janitorial), they 
could certainly ask for and receive a rent increase. Any landlord or manager could incon-
testably raise the rent if they discovered that more tenants had moved into the apartment 
than originally agreed upon. To make these or any other cases, though, one had to fill out 
a petition, submit receipts, and then wait—sometimes for weeks, often for a few months. 
And if landlords felt the columns and boxes could not convey their plight, they had space 
to write, to nest the numbers in a more compelling narrative.31
Thousands of landlords tried to grow their income the legal way. In the first five months 
of the peace, Chicago’s OPA office reported that landlords’ petitions pending held steady at 
about 2,300 per month. Thousands more telephoned the OPA office in the same period: 
the OPA tallied an average of 24,565 phone calls per month, and administrators calculated 
that just over half of these came from landlords. Business remained brisk in the OPA’s Chi-
cago office well into 1946: in the first half of that year, over 25,000 people on average (per 
month) made what were called personal calls, journeying to the downtown office to get a 
face-to-face hearing. Indeed, the human traffic was so heavy that rent officials had to assign 
two policemen full time simply to manage the crowds. These long lines of personal callers, 
too, tended to be split almost evenly, with owners slightly outnumbering tenants.32
A more sinister read of these calls might yield a different conclusion: that owners 
sought guidance about the law not to follow it, but to flout it. It does appear that they 
30 U.S. Department of Labor, “Effect of Wartime Housing Shortages on Home Ownership,” Monthly Labor 
Review, 62 (April 1946), 560–66. On rent control’s effect on the housing market, see Glenn H. Beyer, Housing: A 
Factual Analysis (New York, 1958), 53, 55. Lebowitz suggests that rent control would have lowered landlords’ profits 
had Congress not made at least a few modifications to the law; see Lebowitz, “‘Above Party, Class, or Creed,’” 462. 
On builders’ hostility, see Ryan to Tippett et al., memo, May 4, 1945, folder: Narrative Reports, 1945 (2), box 6, 
entry 107, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. 
31 OPA, Some Answers to Landlords’ Questions about OPA Rent Control (Washington, 1946). In fact, the OPA found 
that the net income of “the vast majority of landlords” had increased during the war because vacancies had disap-
peared, price controls held other commodity expenses down, and landlords had to do far less redecorating to attract 
and keep tenants: ibid., n.p.; see also John J. Scofield to District Rent Executives and Area Rent Directors, memo, 
April 12, 1946, folder: Executive Memos, 286–398 (1), box 1, entry 174, Serial Memoranda of Regional Rent Ex-
ecutive, 1942–1946, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
32 Harold B. Farley to Rae E. Walters, memo, Jan. 16, 1946, Area Statistics from D-501 Reports, Aug. 1945 
through Dec. 1945, Chicago Defense Rental Area, Region VI, Jan. 15, 1946, folder: Narrative Reports, 1945 (1), 
box 6, entry 107, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. Average comes from a tally of January, Febru-
ary, March, May, and June of 1946, Area Rent Office Operating Reports (April was missing). Reports for 1946 in 
folders: Narrative Reports, 1945 (2), ibid.; Narrative Reports, Jan./June 1946, ibid.; and Narrative Reports, July/
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knew the rules well, for the cases that came into the Chicago office show that they tried 
to squeeze profit from tenants with maneuvers that were either just shy of illegal or were 
what I will call rent crimes. Faced with a postwar cap on rents and the irritations of paper-
work and waiting, owners looked for income in every corner of every room in their build-
ings. In fact, sometimes they invented rooms out of whole cloth—literally. Back on Elm 
Street, Kathrine “Kitty” Stertz created a rental unit that passed curtains off as walls, land-
ing her in court and her tenant on the pages of Time as the poster girl for demobilization’s 
urban housing crisis. Stertz owned and managed an old four-story brick mansion at 77 
East Elm, just one block from the lakefront, in a much whiter and more affluent apart-
ment house district than the mainly African American West Elm area. She described her 
place as a “residence club” that could house World War II veterans attending school, who 
“in some instances . . . are married and come to Chicago to take such courses accompa-
nied by their wives or families.” Stertz told the OPA she could provide “adequate and suit-
This 1944 photograph of Kitty Stertz’s building at 77 East Elm Street (center) 
shows the more upscale housing on the other end of Elm Street, close to Lake 
Michigan. Built in 1889, Stertz’s building was typical of the row houses built in 
the fashionable areas of the Near North Side. Stertz called her property a “residence 
club” that could house returning veterans and their families, but it was mainly 
rented by young white singles who worked in the area. Courtesy Chicago Historical 
Society, HB-07923.
Dec. 1946, ibid. On police presence, see Farley to Walters, memo, March 14, 1946, folder: Narrative Reports, Jan./
June 1946, ibid. 
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able accommodations” not only for G.I. families but for the legions of job seekers com-
ing into the city.33
Betty Ackerman was one of these—a twenty-year-old single white woman who came 
to the city looking for work. Although Stertz had advertised her property as a place for 
veterans, it was peopled mainly with young singles such as Ackerman who worked in 
white-collar jobs in Chicago’s nearby office buildings or as waitresses at local restaurants 
and bars. Ackerman and two friends arrived in June 1945 from small-town Menominee, 
Michigan, and the three immediately bunked in one of Stertz’s small basement rooms—
hardly the “residence club” Stertz had promised. As Ackerman described it, living condi-
tions were miserable: “We had neither closet or wardrobe and shared the bathroom with 
approximately eighteen others.” One of the other two “girls” (as they all called them-
selves) eventually returned to Menominee, and this set in a motion a series of involuntary 
moving days within the building. In one instance, Stertz simply plunked Ackerman into 
a second floor room “to live with three girls I did not know.” A vacancy there motivated 
Stertz to move Ackerman yet again. This last one—and the way it was done—proved 
the last straw. Ackerman returned home from her waitressing job on a Sunday afternoon 
only to find that Stertz had moved her belongings back to the basement. As Ackerman 
recounted it, Stertz described this as a “nice little room,” but it was actually a “rigged up 
affair . . . that looked like a very shoddly [sic] erected tent.” Indeed, it was more campsite 
than apartment: Stertz had simply hung a curtain around a cot, chair, and table and called 
it a room. (See the cover photograph and the label on page 1198.) Ackerman added one 
last detail that hinted at the gender immodesty of it all, saying her cot sat “only seven feet 
from where the janitor slept.”34
Ackerman’s basement tent was the worst of it, and layered on top of Stertz’s more 
routine rent crimes—overcharging, reneging on promised services—the case finally gen-
erated an investigation. An OPA staffer began to poke around in April 1946, and as he 
walked the halls and peeked into Stertz’s fourteen rooms, he scribbled impressions into 
his notepad, most of them a confirmation of tenants’ accumulated complaints. He found 
people packed into tiny rooms like too many clothes stuffed into a small closet. Stertz 
routinely crammed three or four people into a “single,” generating triple or quadruple the 
monthly income allowed by rent control. Tenants verified that Stertz had shuffled them 
around, depending on the ratio of tenants to beds and beds to rooms, apparently a fairly 
frequent practice, judging from cases elsewhere in the neighborhood. The investigator de-
scribed the situation as “a bad case of inflammatory rents . . . being run as the Landlord 
pleases.” When he interviewed Stertz about overcharging, he said she “tried to stick it 
down my throat” that she was in compliance. His tour went from bad to worse, however, 
when he entered the basement and found Ackerman’s curtained cot. Even he was startled 
by the sight. His handwritten report concluded: “Have this LL [landlord] into the office 
Quick—This case is really bad.”35
33 Almost half of the cases reviewed had women involved in managing the building—as owners (part of a hus-
band-wife ownership team) or as a hired landlord (often single, sometimes part of a hired husband-wife manage-
ment team). Unfortunately, because the OPA/OHE used landlord as the catchall term for anyone who received rent 
payments, there is often no distinction between an owner-manager such as Kathrine Stertz or a hired landlord such 
as Mrs. La Dolce. Kathrine A. Stertz to Honorable Director of the OPA, May 1, 1946, folder: Stertz, Kitty (1 of 4), 
box 67, entry 110, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. 
34 Miss Bette Ackerman to Mr. Samuel Broyd, Aug. 11, 1947, folder: Stertz, Kitty (4 of 4), ibid. Ackerman 
spelled her name as Bette, but all other records use Betty. 
35 Handwritten reports of Examiner, April 10–11, 1946, folder: Stertz, Kitty (1 of 4), ibid. 
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Just a few weeks later, Time magazine told the world just how bad it was for working 
girls, young marrieds, and anyone else in American postwar cities trying to find decent 
housing. Apparently “boiling with rage at her landlady and the OPA both,” Ackerman 
had invited the Chicago Daily Tribune to her basement tent, hoping to spur a speedy 
judgment. Time then picked up the local story, featuring a photo of Ackerman sitting 
on her cot in a housecoat, curtain open, over a caption that read: “Shameful crowding.” 
The article decried Stertz’s “amazingly overcrowded” slum “on the edge of Chicago’s ritzy 
Gold Coast,” depicting her as a villainous landlord using the cruelest of gender imagery: 
“Landlady Stertz was a greedy, bulky, granite-faced woman who, on hot Chicago nights, 
would snooze sweatily naked on the parlor couch.” Time suggested, too, that Stertz’s greed 
risked sexual impropriety for the young Ackerman, noting that the “sleazy grey curtains 
. . . could not be pulled together; anyone passing could peer through.” The fact that Stertz 
brazenly called this six-by-nine-foot space a “room” and charged a working girl $24 per 
month for it turned Ackerman into a “newspaper heroine,” said Time. After the coverage, 
she received flowers from the Allied Florists Association and numerous offers for better 
housing.36
Most city dwellers were not so lucky, though. From the single white females of East 
Elm to African American families on West Elm, postwar living conditions ran the gamut 
from acceptable, to marginal, to a new category penned by one of Brugger’s tenants: “ant 
fit for a dog.” Renters told officials that they would evict themselves if they could, but as 
one housewife wrote, “the way things are a person can’t find any place to live.” Even Ack-
erman admitted, “I . . . would have moved had I been able to find a place.”37 These people 
had no place to go because the war was an industrial boom and a construction bust. The 
Chicago Plan Commission estimated that wartime migration had added permanently to 
the city about a quarter of a million new residents. Over a year after V-J Day, an OPA re-
port lamented: “People coming into the city still exceed those going out.”38 But continued 
shortages of materials and labor, investment in suburban growth versus urban renewal, 
and the widespread devotion to single-family housing development kept most working 
people in the rental market for years after the war—in Chicago and across the nation. 
This meant that the vast majority of urbanites experienced the demobilization years not 
as homeowners, as we may imagine, but as renters, subject to scarcity and the will and 
whim of landlords.39
36 Time, April 29, 1946, p. 26. Details of the case are also offered in North Loop News, June 27, 1946, pp. 1, 6; 
Chicago Daily Tribune, April 16, 1946, p. 17; ibid., April 17, 1946, p. 25; ibid., April 18, 1946, p. 8; ibid., April 19, 
1946, p. 3. Clippings of the North Loop News articles can be found in folder: Stertz, Kitty (3 of 4), box 67, entry 
110, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter; the Chicago Daily Tribune was found at the Chicago Histori-
cal Society. One account suggested that Ackerman had a friend who worked at the Chicago Daily Tribune, enabling 
her to get the coverage. 
37 Cora Brooks to OPA, n.d., received Feb. 20, 1946, folder: La Dolce, Peter and Mary (5), box 42, entry 110, 
Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. Mr. E. Radtke to Mr. O’Conner, March 5, 1946, folder: 4322 N. 
Kenmore Ave., box 29, entry 110B, Area Rent Select Samples, 1943–1951, ibid.; this housewife signed her letter in 
her husband’s name, a not uncommon practice for married female letter writers in these rent cases, who may have 
felt a letter in a man’s name might have carried more weight, given the gender conventions of the era. Ackerman to 
Broyd, Aug. 11, 1947, folder: Stertz, Kitty (4 of 4), box 67, entry 110, ibid. 
38 Chicago Plan Commission, “Housing Goals for Chicago,” 1946, p. 4, Municipal Reference Collection; Woods 
to Tippett et al., memo, Nov. 5, 1946, folder: Narrative Reports, July/Dec. 1946, box 6, entry 107, Records of the 
Office of the Housing Expediter. 
39 Home ownership on the Near North Side stalled in the postwar years; a mere 8.7% of all dwelling units were 
owner-occupied in 1950. For the city as a whole, the figure was just under 30%. Even by 1960, these numbers had 
not changed much: the city’s owner-occupied units climbed only to 32.7%, and on the Near North Side the rate 
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It was protection from this will and whim that drove so many tenants into OPA/OHE of-
fices in the postwar years. If owners griped that controls forestalled their prosperity, then 
tenants hailed controls as a much-needed economic boost. In fact, their claims echo the 
kind of “rights-conscious consumerism” Meg Jacobs found in her study of meat consum-
ers.40 But controlling the price of rent was different from regulating the price of hamburg-
er. The regulation of food (or any household item) took place at the store—a public space 
(although privately owned) where volunteer price checkers could spy inflated prices, in-
vite an OPA inspection, and later see the evidence of their activism. The regulation of rent 
during and after the war, however, was a more invasive kind of state intervention, a point 
overlooked by scholars of price controls. Most reports of violations could be resolved only 
by a visit from an investigator, whose job it was to peer into bedrooms and bathrooms, 
noting dirty sinks and unwashed linens. Violators were then summoned to the Chicago 
The Office of Price Administration (OPA) and the Office of the Housing Expediter (OHE) would 
receive letters, postcards, and telegrams from both named and anonymous tipsters about rent 
abuses. Sometimes these were sent by current renters, but they were also sent by nonresidents who 
had somehow discovered the rent crime. This Western Union telegram was sent by a resident at 77 
East Elm Street on August 13, 1946, one of several tips to come into the OPA about this building, 
managed and owned by Kitty Stertz. Courtesy National Archives and Records Administration, Great 
Lakes Region, Chicago (RG 252, Entry 110, Box 67, Folder: Stertz, Kitty, [1 of 4]).
actually dropped to 6%. On postwar housing trends, see Davies, Housing Reform during the Truman Administration, 
40–41; and Jon Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City (Baltimore, 1993), 99–126. On race and housing 
trends, see Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 18–29. On postwar housing trends nationwide, see U.S. Department 
of Labor, “Trends in Housing during the War and Postwar Periods,” Monthly Labor Review, 64 (Jan. 1947), 11–23. 
On Chicago’s homeowner rates, see Hauser and Kitagawa, eds., Local Community Fact Book for Chicago, 1950, 5, 
39; and Kitagawa and Taeuber, eds., Local Community Fact Book, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1960, 3, 31.
40 Jacobs, “‘How About Some Meat?,’” 921. 
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OPA/OHE office for a “compliance conference,” a face-to-face encounter where they had to 
make nice with tenants in the company of a government overseer. In the aftermath of that 
conference, a landlord could still make things unpleasant for a tenant in all kinds of subtle 
ways—just barely enough heat, a repair job that solved one problem but created another, 
or a constant scowl that made it a chore to ask for anything. In contrast, those who re-
ported a grocer’s price gouging never had to face such nuisances—they could just leave 
the store. Price control of housing, then, necessitated an intimate clasp with the state’s 
regulatory arm. For owners and building managers, the reach was too long. For renters, 
though, who were the bulk of the city’s inhabitants, the state was a welcome houseguest 
into the early fifties.
It is easy to understand this hospitality if one surveys apartment housing from a ten-
ant’s standpoint. We have already glimpsed conditions on Elm Street, but complaints 
from elsewhere on the Near North Side underscore the inadequacy and indignity of post-
war housing. Dirt preoccupied many renters. Those whose rent included a weekly supply 
of fresh linens griped that they had to reuse soiled towels and sheets because of cuts in 
maid service. Complaints of missing toilet paper, too, popped up with some frequency. 
Many renters on the Near North Side (41 percent) shared bathrooms, so they did not 
control how often the roll got changed. Bathing, as well, could feel like an insult when 
a tenant could not rely on a steady supply of hot water. Many said they received it only 
in the evening or on weekends; some received a steady stream in the winter but not in 
the summer. Such conditions collided with tenants’ high hopes that the living would get 
easier after the war. As one frustrated renter put it: “In summation, I would not call this 
the ‘MORE ABUNDANT LIFE’” (emphasis hers).41
These postwar conditions, of course, had been shaped by earlier decades of owner 
apathy and tenant activism and by the advent of codes and their sporadic enforcement. 
World War II pushed people into housing that had deteriorated during the Great Depres-
sion, exacerbating the problem of neglect with overcrowding. Wartime building owners 
subdivided apartments into the kind of cramped quarters already seen on Elm Street, 
and these conversions became the architectural inheritance of the postwar generation in 
Chicago and around the country. The Chicago City Council did regulate some aspects 
of these conversions, encouraging owners to install new doors, for example, to separate 
newly divided flats and to give tenants a second emergency exit. The council further 
strengthened the codes in 1949, but the city’s confusing regulations proved baffling for 
the average tenant or landlord to understand. Code enforcement, too, was decentralized 
and poorly staffed and managed. Most important, the 1949 revision applied only to new 
construction, meaning the vast majority of postwar renters could not expect protection 
from their city government.42
Federal rent law was grafted onto this system of local housing ordinances in a way that 
helped fill such gaps in Chicago’s codes. Although the OPA/OHE could regulate only price, 
agency officials nevertheless became embroiled in disputes over codelike issues, such as 
41 Tenant’s Statement, Agnes Weidenherner, Dec. 31, 1949, folder: 215 East Erie, box 17, entry 110B, Records 
of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
42 On Chicago’s wartime and postwar housing codes, see Seligman, Block by Block, 39–67. On Chicago’s apart-
ments pre–World War II, see the famous survey by Edith Abbott, The Tenements of Chicago, 1908–1935 (Chicago, 
1936); see also Perry R. Duis, Challenging Chicago: Coping with Everyday Life, 1837–1920 (Urbana, 1998), 67–
110. On prewar landlord-tenant negotiations, see, for example, Jared N. Day, Urban Castles: Tenement Housing and 
Landlord Activism in New York City, 1890–1943 (New York, 1999). 
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faulty plumbing, whenever owners and managers violated a service promised on the regis-
tration form. This federal-city interface appears to have worked well in Chicago; the OHE’s 
legal staff consulted regularly with city housing officials and reported “splendid coopera-
tion” with municipal judges when taking a landlord to court. This relationship appears to 
have functioned especially well for tenants, too, for they could rely on federal rent laws 
where municipal codes had failed them. In fact, four years of wartime regulation and the 
tremendous visibility of the OPA/OHE through its branch office system almost certainly 
contributed to a sense among renters that their federal, not their local, government could 
better address reconversion’s housing predicaments. This is why the OPA/OHE received 
some twelve thousand visits and an almost equal number of telephone calls from tenants 
each month during the first half of 1946 alone.43
To lay claim to the abundant life, Chicago’s renters—like their owners and manag-
ers—devised an array of strategies to cope with demobilization’s housing costs. Some of 
their tactics were legitimate, while others were clever violations of the law. On the lawful 
end, tenants who could not afford a rent might barter with the landlord or building man-
ager, trading a reduced price for cleaning up around the property or stoking the furnace 
in the morning. Other survival strategies hark back to the turn of the century, when ten-
ants sublet their own small flats to afford the rent. In fact, many landlord-tenant disputes 
turned on this issue of subleasing. Owners had a right to know exactly how many people 
occupied their building, and federal law recognized this, stipulating that even one new 
resident justified a rent hike. But many tenants sublet on the sly, for smuggling in a few 
others to reduce the rent was faster and less confrontational than filling out government 
forms or having a quarrel with the owner. The housing shortage created a semi-nomadic 
urban population eager to find shelter, making it easy to find subtenants. All one had to 
do was put out the word—and not very far, for it was often kin who bunked together. 
When the OPA investigator Elmer Hedin first visited West Elm Street in August 1945, he 
found people living cheek to jowl: “Practically every tenant in [the] building has room-
ers,” he observed. Odessa Wallington, for example, sublet with her seven children from 
Herbie Smith, almost certainly a relative. There may have been close to twenty people liv-
ing in Smith’s flat, and “only a few are registered,” Hedin noted. This covert arrangement 
lasted over a year, until the La Dolces discovered it and evicted Wallington and her chil-
dren as “squatters.” Stories of how people doubled up for the duration are well known, 
but it is important to recognize, as well, that even into the mid-fifties there were, nation-
wide, about two million married couples or single parents still living with relatives.44 
Another way tenants economized was to use their flats as workplaces, again, much like 
earlier working-class urbanites. This was not as common as subleasing, but rent records 
suggest that some did it to supplement erratic monthly incomes. For Benny MacAbee, 
income on the side was the steadiest stream available. MacAbee was a forty-eight-year-
old African American who rented from the owners, Allen and Murdis Mosley, an African 
43 Milton Gordon to Norman B. Shogren, memo, Sept. 29, 1947, folder: Monthly Reports—Chicago, 1947, 
Oct./Dec., box 5, entry 107, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. Joseph B. Kovarik to Morris A. Lieber-
man, memo, March 30, 1949, folder: Monthly Narrative Reports, Chicago, Ill., Region VI, ibid. 
44 Hedin to Anderson, memo, Aug. 30, 1945, folder: La Dolce, Peter and Mary (2), box 42, entry 110, ibid.; af-
fidavit, Odessa Wallington, Aug. 27, 1947, Woods v. La Dolce and La Dolce. Figure comes from census data cited in 
Beyer, Housing, 16; and Davies, Housing Reform during the Truman Administration, 103. Hirsch shows that subten-
ancy was more widely practiced among African Americans; see Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 24–25. Given its 
underground practice, the OPA/OHE did not maintain statistics on subtenancy, but the evidence is abundant. 
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American couple whose building sat just a few short blocks from Brugger’s Elm Street 
property. In 1949, MacAbee was a fire cleaner for one of Chicago’s railroad lines, one of 
the dirtier service jobs in the industry, but the work was sporadic, making it impossible 
for him to pay the wildly overpriced $80 per month rent. When MacAbee complained 
that the rent “was too steep for me” (the legal cap was only $18), the Mosleys suggested he 
take in roomers—a truly ironic twist on the usually furtive practice. Following the Mos-
leys’ suggestion, then, MacAbee sublet two rooms to two couples, with whom he and his 
wife and two small children shared the flat’s kitchen and bathroom.45 
But splitting the rent did not give MacAbee the financial stability he sought, so he be-
gan working out of his home. His part-time work was a bit unusual, though. According to 
Allen Mosley, “Tenant MacAbee conducts parties and card games several times a week,” 
and he made reliable profits each month.46 MacAbee did not dispute this in his affida-
vit, and though one might question this as “work,” his weekly card sharping may be seen 
as a legitimate way for someone living on the margin to boost income. Like many Afri-
can American men, MacAbee had limited opportunities in the postwar labor market; he 
was not unemployed but underemployed, and his card parties were something of an end 
run—and a fun one, at that—around the employment discrimination faced by so many 
urban black men of the “greatest generation.”47
What makes MacAbee and Mosley an intriguing pair is the surprising similarity of 
their economic predicament, even though as landlord and tenant they sat on opposite 
sides of the rent control debate. For his part, Mosley was unconcerned with either the 
morality or legality of MacAbee’s card parties. He just wanted a cut of the action: “I have 
no objection to him conducting these games,” Mosley said in a petition, “except that I 
wish to have an extra allowance for the extra lights and gas that is used up. . . . [MacA-
bee] burns my lights almost all night long.”48 Mosley, too, then, was barely making it, 
even though he had owned the property since 1944. In fact, OHE inspector Louis Klar 
described the place as a “run down building” in a “near north side slum area rapidly being 
vacated by whites.” And this was Mosley’s third acquisition, said Klar, probably purchased 
with a land installment contract, one of the only lending instruments available to African 
American home buyers. Its low down payment but high price and interest rate scarcely 
made Mosley an owner in the conventional sense; he was more like a lessor with a shaky 
option to buy. Such contracts, according to Arnold Hirsch, were “a way of life” for African 
Americans in the postwar years.49 
In these financial straits, it is easy to see why Mosley reported MacAbee just to get his 
share. He was already trying other ways to stay afloat. According to Klar, Mosley “makes 
it a practice to convert flats as they become vacant into rooming house units with com-
45 Affidavit, Bennie MacAbee, Jan. 11, 1949, folder: 1016 North Cleveland Ave., box 7, entry 110B, Records of 
the Office of the Housing Expediter.
46 Landlord’s Petition for Adjustment of Rent, Allen Mosley, March 6, 1950, ibid.
47 On employment discrimination against urban blacks, see Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 91–123. For 
Chicago, specifically, see Duncan and Duncan, Negro Population of Chicago, 65–75. On survival strategies among 
African Americans in an earlier period, see St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro 
Life in a Northern City (New York, 1945). On industrial demobilization, see Ballard, Shock of Peace, 123–41. 
48 Landlord’s Petition for Adjustment of Rent, Mosley, March 6, 1950, folder: 1016 North Cleveland Ave., box 
7, entry 110B, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
49 Investigation Report, 1016 North Cleveland Ave., Louis Klar, Jan. 12, 1950, ibid. On land installment con-
tracts, see Lynne Beyer Sagalyn, “Mortgage Lending in Older Urban Neighborhoods: Lessons from Past Experi-
ence,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 465 (Jan. 1983), 98–108. On the use of these 
contracts in Chicago, see Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 31–33.
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munity kitchen privileges and shared bathrooms.” And he was but one of many African 
American owners around the city to do so. According to the Olivet Institute, a Near 
North Side settlement house, “cutting up the buildings is the only way some owners can 
continue to finance their properties.”50
But this economizing put black landlords at odds with their black tenants. As Fred-
erick D. Pollard of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations warned, any African 
American who bought property on contract was “going to have to abuse his property in 
some way to meet this financial burden.”51 Mosley heaped this abuse on the building, and 
his tenants had the bruises to show for it. Reports from 1946 through 1950 show a pat-
tern of complaints about vermin, poor plumbing, and spotty electricity and heat. And 
yet Mosley was a man caught between the free market’s financial discrimination—which 
forced him to use the installment contract and scrimp on maintenance—and demobili-
zation’s housing regulation—which forced him to keep rents low. In this sense, he is a 
sympathetic character in our story. But his tenants, too, were trying to find prosperity in 
the postwar city, and they, too, were pinned by market forces not of their making: uneven 
employment, job discrimination, and the exclusion—as renters or potential owners—
from all but a handful of areas in Chicago, which locked them into slum housing. 
Mosley’s and MacAbee’s stories are not the same, of course, but they are intertwined, 
part of same historical forces that brought them to Chicago to live together under one 
leaky roof. Mosley’s financial statement shows a meager nest egg, his debt threatening 
to exhaust his income. An OHE attorney conceded that, although MacAbee had “been 
overcharged so flagrantly,” Mosley had no cash on hand to refund him. So when Mosley 
knocked on MacAbee’s door for the rent, he did so with desperation, knowing that he was 
always one missed payment away from losing his entire investment.52 When MacAbee an-
swered the knock, he did so with his government behind him. He was likely buoyed by 
the fact that other tenants had complained before him and that rent officials had taken 
them seriously and prosecuted their complaints to a happy ending—a refund. This paved 
the way for him to protest, an underemployed railroad worker who could not read or 
write, who had to dictate his first complaint and sign it with an X. When Mosley filed 
his own petition in response, it could not be mailed to MacAbee, as was the custom, for 
he could not read it. So both men had to travel to the OHE’s downtown office. There, 
MacAbee and Mosley sat face to face as the OHE negotiator read aloud Mosley’s version 
of their quarrel. After the tale was told, MacAbee feebly printed his full name, indicat-
ing that he had understood. And there they sat, brought together by migration, racism, 
market forces, and their own choices, ambitions, and hurts, each trying to find his peace 
dividend but at odds as landlord and tenant. Olivet’s report suggested that MacAbee and 
Mosley’s situation was not exceptional. On the Near North Side, “there was ‘much ex-
50 Investigation Report, 1016 North Cleveland Ave., Klar, Jan. 12, 1950, folder: 1016 North Cleveland Ave., 
box 7, entry 110B, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter; “Olivet Plans for Its Future!,” 1958, p. 46, 
folder: Welfare Council 387-3, box 387, Olivet Community Center, 1935–1957, Welfare Council of Metropolitan 
Chicago Papers (Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Ill.).
51 Statement of Frederick D. Pollard, testifying before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, quoted in Hirsch, 
Making the Second Ghetto, 33.
52 According to Klar, Mosley “told some tenants that instead of making refunds he will sell out and quit the 
business”: Investigative Report, 1016 N. Cleveland Ave. Knowing Mosley’s financial back story, this was not an 
idle threat; see Financial Statement, Allen Mosley, March 7, 1950, folder: 1016 North Cleveland Ave., box 7, entry 
110B, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. D. M. Scheffer, memo to file, March 1, 1950, Investigation 
Report, ibid.
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ploiting by whites . . . especially to Negroes,’” said a black leader, but, unfortunately, there 
was also exploitation “‘by Negroes . . . to Negroes.’”53 
Mosley’s predicament takes us into the third and final part of the triangular relation-
ship in Chicago’s apartment housing: the economic plight of the building manager. If, as 
owner and tenant, Mosley and MacAbee were not far apart economically, then this was 
even truer of building managers and their tenants. As the historian Paul Groth found for 
managers earlier in the century, unless an operator owned the building, “its revenue was 
not substantial.”54 Rent records suggest the same was true at midcentury. In working-class 
Chicago, building managers were more like tenants than owners; they just happened to 
have found something a bit more secure. In times of scarcity and price inflation, it was 
a shrewd financial move to hire oneself out as a manager, for it provided a modest but 
steady income (one could still hold another job), and, in a time of rampant turnover, it 
offered lodging with minimal chance for eviction (a safety net no tenant had). 
It was not easy work, though. On West Elm, Brugger, who lived several miles to the 
north, had outsourced his responsibilities to the La Dolces, insulating himself from the 
dirty work of keeping humans suitably sheltered. This way, he could draw a profit without 
the drudgery. Not so for the La Dolces. As hired hands, situated between ownership and 
tenancy, they had to interact with Elm Street renters—listen to their complaints, meet 
their eyes, and weigh their own financial interests against those of others in their econom-
ic tribe. They had a fragile kind of financial security, for, in order to stay on as Brugger’s 
managers, they had to charge tenants enough to cover both their own rent to Brugger and 
the building’s operating costs. And they had to keep tenants quiet. After all, the luxury 
of absentee ownership was refuge from the riffraff, so managers had to keep the building 
profitable without provoking an insurrection.
We can see how building management was more burden than boon if we go just a few 
blocks south of Elm to 211 East Superior Street, where OPA investigator R. S. O’Toole 
found people sleeping in “as many double deck bunks as the room will hold.” Here, 
too, the manager, Mrs. Lancaster, had annexed the basement as sleeping territory, try-
ing to squeeze yet more rent from the bowels of the building. According to O’Toole, it 
was “mostly GI’s” who lived here in the fall of 1946, each paying $10 to $12 per week 
for the privilege of sleeping in bunks six to a room, accommodations roughly on a par 
with their wartime barracks. Mrs. Lancaster promised breakfast and daily maid service to 
the veterans, but O’Toole noticed that, at the time of his 4:30 p.m. visit, the beds were 
still unmade. His observations were confirmed by an anonymous tipster, who identi-
fied himself only as “a government worker who is still looking for a room.” After touring 
the premises, the “government worker” reported what he saw, mocking Mrs. Lancaster’s 
claim that a space divided off “by a sheet of dirty comp-board” could actually be called a 
“living room.”55 
53 Landlord’s Petition for Adjustment of Rent [Mosley], statement of Bennie MacAbee, March 6, 1950, folder: 
1016 North Cleveland Ave., box 7, entry 110B, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter. As the OHE tried 
to protect MacAbee from Mosley’s overcharging, it should be noted that it later raised the maximum rent from $18 
to $40 per month. See Order Adjusting Maximum Rent, March 15, 1950, ibid. On exploitation by African Ameri-
cans, see “Olivet Plans for Its Future!,” 46. 
54 Paul Groth, Living Downtown: The History of Residential Hotels in the United States (Berkeley, 1994), 179–
80. 
55 Handwritten report, R. S. O’Toole, Sept. 24, 1946, folder: 211 E. Superior St., box 47, entry 110B, Records 
of the Office of the Housing Expediter; A Government Worker . . . to Office of Price Administration, May 1, 1947, 
ibid.
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True, Mrs. Lancaster broke her promises of a good first meal and a clean room, and 
she flagrantly overcharged for both, but there are clues that she was not living the more 
abundant life either. When O’Toole confronted her about registration violations, she told 
him, “don’t blame me I have nothing to do with the registering,” adding she was in “no 
mood” to file the paperwork. Undaunted, O’Toole continued through the house, where-
upon he discovered a bunk bed in the basement—not quite the farce of Stertz’s tent, but 
still another slapdash accommodation that passed for a “room.” But he then spied another 
bed, which turned out to be Mrs. Lancaster’s. In fact, in order to get to their bunks, the 
“guests” (as O’Toole wryly called the vets) had to walk right through Mrs. Lancaster’s 
quarters. The location of Mrs. Lancaster’s bed—in the dank basement of an old building, 
adjacent to the lodgers—suggests that her situation was little better than the G.I. tenants 
who slept stacked like firewood just a few feet away.56
Cases throughout the Near North Side and elsewhere suggest a precarious comfort for 
the city’s hired landlords. In one way, they were owners’ accomplices, trying to shift the 
costs of running a building to those sheltered under its roof. On the other hand, they 
faced real financial predicaments, akin to those of their tenants, which is why they either 
squelched or fought renters’ complaints so doggedly. On the Near North Side, there was 
a whole world of rooming and apartment house managers who were gaming the system. 
Some merely tried to raise utility bills to pay for tenants’ electricity usage of a new ap-
pliance: the television. Others, such as the La Dolces, were guilty of more egregious rent 
crimes, left alone by the owners to battle it out with tenants for the same scraps of re-
conversion. Certainly, Chicago’s building managers had some of the same tools as owners 
(overcharging or cutting services to the bone), and as we have seen they could and did use 
those tools to make life pretty miserable for tenants. But without the financial safety net 
of ownership, many used the modicum of power they had to grab what they could from 
even less powerful tenants. They occupied the middle floor of the upstairs-downstairs re-
lationship between owners and renters, and this location gave them little financial certain-
ty. In fact, it gave them only a front-row seat to see the instability of tenancy and the trials 
of ownership. Neither looked like the bounty that had been promised during the war. 
In the aftermath of World War II, some of the crucial questions raised by the mobiliza-
tion remained relevant and urgent amid the demobilization: What did citizens owe their 
state and one another? What did the state owe its citizens? These were hard questions, 
worked out on the ground first, and so the details from inside Chicago’s flats matter: 
no hot water, a constant chill, missing toilet paper. These are scenes that reveal how 
real people slogged through demobilization in the industrial city. Such smaller dramas, 
played out not only on Elm Street but in cities around the country, reveal wrinkles in the 
war’s coming-home stories that cannot be smoothed out so easily. 
These smaller dramas, though, provide the raw material for reframing larger scholarly 
debates about the nature of the New Deal state after World War II. Tearing down the 
war proved not to be so simple. Demobilization forced policy makers to reevaluate the 
relationship between the city and the sword. How long should military controls on pro-
duction and price remain in the postwar city? Was peacetime synonymous with deregu-
56 Handwritten report, O’Toole, Sept. 24, 1946, ibid.
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lation, or was the federal government obligated to help citizens navigate the transition? 
Such dilemmas led Harry S. Truman to complain: “I’m telling you that I find peace is 
hell.”57 Truman and his policy makers ricocheted between New Deal and wartime mod-
els of an activist, regulatory state and mounting pressures to unleash free enterprise as a 
hedge against the twin disasters of inflation and unemployment. Their decisions about 
how to manage a smooth reconversion were shaped from the top by business leaders and 
by past policy failures—World War I’s aftermath, in particular. From the bottom, potent 
coalitions of consumers, workers, and tenants pressed their government, employers, and 
landlords—the institutional and human faces of demobilization—for the rewards of vic-
tory: a good wage, a fair price, a decent life. 
These rewards—or, more accurately, how much or how little government it would take 
to secure them—are the centerpiece of demobilization’s history. Urban working people 
had struggled for them before, most recently during the Great Depression, and decades 
earlier, when industry and immigrants crowded American cities. The conditions on Elm 
Street are unique to neither time nor place. But World War II set in motion a new set of 
expectations for a minimum standard of living. After a cruel and prolonged depression, 
the government asked citizens for a depth and breadth of sacrifice lasting longer than the 
last war, and, in exchange, it pledged a people’s peace dividend with generous wages, af-
fordable housing, and leisure time to spend what had been earned. This rhetoric ignited 
and then stoked people’s expectations for the duration, and so, when the war was over, 
Americans felt entitled to claim what had been promised.58 
Over a year after V-J Day, an OPA staffer told a radio audience: “Rent control doesn’t 
just happen to a community. The request must come from the people.”59 The stories 
from Elm Street show that Chicago’s working class did more than ask; they demanded, 
in a tone and language that was more political than deferential. Most had no telephones, 
checking accounts, typewriters, or carbon paper, and they still managed to write out com-
plaints in the requisite duplicate. They were afraid, but they still showed up at the down-
town office, waited in long lines, and told their stories, risking eviction or the slow, incre-
mental retributions, such as waning heat. They invited the state into their flats, throwing 
open the doors to bedrooms and bathrooms to let federal officials see what landlord greed 
looked like. As the “government worker” who reported Mrs. Lancaster’s G.I. slum in-
sisted: “If your office is still on the job, and I hope it is, take a look at this DUMP.”60 But 
landlords and building managers were “the people,” too, and they rejected the home visits 
that exposed their rent crimes. Rent control was for them antidemocratic, an impediment 
to their own postwar reward. Where it cushioned the blows of demobilization for tenants, 
it inflicted new ones on those who collected rent for a living. 
57 Truman quoted in Flamm, “Price Controls, Politics, and the Perils of Policy by Analogy,” 347.
58 The argument about World War II as a trigger for raised expectations has been made persuasively by several 
historians. See, for example, John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War 
II (New York, 1976), 8–9, 92–105; John Bodnar, “Saving Private Ryan and Postwar Memory in America,” Ameri-
can Historical Review, 106 (June 2001), 806–7; Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 70–75; Jacobs, “‘How About Some 
Meat?,’” 912; Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, 179–220; Mark Leff, “The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Home 
Front in World War II,” Journal of American History, 77 (March 1991), 1296–1318; Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight, 
19–23; and Robert B. Westbrook, “‘I Want a Girl, Just like the Girl That Married Harry James’: American Women 
and the Problem of Political Obligation in World War II,” American Quarterly, 42 (Dec. 1990), 587–614.
59 Radio Script, Interview with William G. Barr, Oct. 23, 1946, box 5, folder: OPA Radio Scripts, 1945–1947, 
Chicago Regional Office, Administrative Files, Records of the Office of the Housing Expediter.
60 A Government Worker . . . to Office of Price Administration, May 1, 1947, folder: 211 E. Superior St., box 
47, entry 110B, ibid.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jah/article/92/4/1265/742665 by W
hittier C
ollege user on 29 Septem
ber 2020
1291Demobilizing in Chicago, 1945–1953
In the broadest sense, this conflict over rent control can be viewed as a kind of popu-
lar referendum on the postwar fate of the liberal state. The votes were split, depending 
on how much money was in one’s pocket at war’s end. What is remarkable is that tenants 
continued to “vote” for controls long after the war ended—for almost a decade. Indeed, 
the evidence from federal rent records makes a compelling case that working-class sup-
port for an activist state did not melt away after the war as quickly as we have thought. 
Even if we consider the issue from the perspective of owners and managers (whose class 
status often differed little from their tenants), they, too, shared the political outlook that 
it was the federal government’s job to insure their private abundance after the war. What 
this case study points to, then, is a messier political history of the liberal state, one that 
does not fit neatly into the familiar historiographical dualisms of rise and fall or of activ-
ist versus laissez-faire. It may be more accurate to look at the issue in terms of gradations 
of intervention or degrees of governmental activism. If we consider, too, the advent of 
the G.I. Bill and the resilience of social security after the war, it is clear that postwar citi-
zens sought neither a fully activist nor a fully laissez-faire arrangement. Recognizing this 
ambivalence or, perhaps more accurately, this accommodation of a kind of hybrid liberal-
ism may help us better understand other moments of conflict over government’s size and 
scope in the postwar era. 
Finally, the case of rent control reminds us that much of the popular struggle over the 
war’s meanings and rewards took place not in organized social movements, but in spaces 
“common and ordinary,” as Lipsitz says, but still mightily contested. The twists and turns 
of demobilization on Elm Street capture peacetime’s tensions and paradoxes, and they 
call for an analysis of peace as a historical process itself, rather than as merely the moment 
when the fighting stops. If World War II’s popular history has already offered us the plot 
lines of a grand warrior epic, then this history of demobilization can show us the “nonepic 
everyday,” the ordinary yet still compelling tales of war’s aftermath.61
61 The term “nonepic everyday” comes from Patricia Yaeger’s Dirt and Desire: Reconstructing Southern Women’s 
Writing, 1930–1990 (Chicago, 2000), xv; it is here drawn from Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s reference to it in Jacquelyn 
Dowd Hall, “Last Words,” Journal of American History, 89 (June 2002), 30–36, esp. 32. 
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